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Houses as Collateral:
Has the Link between House 
Prices and Consumption
in the U.K. Changed?
I. Introduction
ignificant attention is paid by policymakers in the United 
Kingdom to the relationship between house prices, the 
business cycle, and inflation, on account of the pronounced 
procyclical pattern of house prices. Are house prices a 
symptom of macroeconomic conditions? Or are there 
important feedback effects from house prices to real variables? 
As this paper shows, the data suggest that there is a strong 
comovement of house prices with consumption and with 
consumer durables expenditures in particular. A deeper look at 
the data seems to indicate that house prices are not a source of 
fundamental shocks, but are part of the transmission 
mechanism by which changes in short-term interest rates affect 
consumption, the output gap, and hence inflation. It is 
important for policymakers to study how this transmission 
mechanism works, and this is one objective of our paper. There 
have been numerous studies of the relationship between 
housing and consumption in the United Kingdom.1 However, 
these studies have tended to be partial-equilibrium analyses, 
which are inappropriate for examining the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in the macroeconomy.
Another important set of questions concerns the 
implications for monetary policy of the structural changes 
taking place in the United Kingdom’s retail financial markets—
starting in the early 1980s and still continuing today. As 
documented later, the market for credit cards and unsecured 
loans has seen a large number of new entrants. Increased 
competition in retail credit markets is likely to have widened 
the availability of credit and reduced its price. In the mortgage 
market, a wider range of products has become available, and it 
has become easier for consumers to withdraw housing equity 
to finance consumption. It is important for policymakers to 
understand whether these structural changes in retail financial 
markets have affected the relationship between monetary 
policy and housing variables.
To address these questions, we apply the financial 
accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)—
or BGG—to the household sector. The BGG model is a 
dynamic general-equilibrium model that focuses on the 
macroeconomic effects of imperfections in credit markets. 
Such imperfections generate premia on the external cost of 
raising funds, which in turn affect borrowing decisions. Within 
this framework, endogenous developments in credit markets—
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such as variations in net worth—work to amplify and 
propagate shocks to the macroeconomy. In our model, we 
show that a rise in house prices increases the value of 
collateral available to households. This stimulates 
consumption and housing investment by making it easier 
and cheaper for households to borrow against the value of 
their home. Therefore, fluctuations in house prices amplify 
fluctuations in consumption and housing investment over 
business cycles.
Because house prices affect households’ borrowing 
decisions, structural changes in the market for retail financial 
services—such as those that have occurred in the United 
Kingdom over recent years—are likely to have affected this 
element of the transmission mechanism. Using our model, we 
simulate the impact of financial innovation in the United 
Kingdom. Also examined is the effect of recent improvements 
in households’ ability to access housing collateral. We show 
that this increases the response of consumption to a monetary 
policy shock, but reduces the response of housing investment 
and house prices. In the second experiment, we simulate the 
effect of developments in unsecured consumer credit markets. 
Here, we demonstrate that the effects of a monetary policy 
shock are reversed: the responses of housing investment and 
house prices are larger, but the effect on consumption is 
dampened. Our experiments suggest that the overall change in 
consumption associated with a given change in house prices is 
likely to have risen relative to the past.
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we 
highlight some of the main stylised facts about the business 
cycle, housing, and monetary policy in the United Kingdom, 
and discuss some of the main developments in U.K. financial 
markets in recent years relevant to the household sector. 
Section III outlines the financial accelerator modeling 
framework that we use to capture these stylised facts. In Section 
IV, we run several model simulations to show the changes in 
the relationship between house prices and consumption within 
our model triggered by two types of financial liberalisation: a 
reduction in transaction costs related to accessing housing 
equity and a general reduction in credit constraints as a result 
of better developed, unsecured consumer credit markets. 
Section V concludes.
II. The Housing Market
in the United Kingdom
Stylised Facts from U.K. Data
Chart 1 presents the key housing variables—housing 
investment and house prices—and output.2 House prices move 
strongly with output but lag slightly. Housing investment, 
however, clearly leads output. Housing investment and house 
prices also show a close comovement, and housing investment 
leads house prices. These comovements in the data are 
consistent with a neoclassical world with and without credit 
frictions. For instance, a q-theory of housing investment would 
imply a comovement of housing investment, output, and 
house prices.3 To distinguish between the two theories, we look 
in more detail at the relationship between house prices and 
consumption.
House prices and consumption are depicted in the chart. 
Breaking down consumption into durables and nondurables, 
we see that the strongest relationship seems to be between 
house prices and consumption of durable goods. A q-theory of 
housing investment combined with a standard permanent 
income theory of consumption could generate a comovement 
of house prices and consumption generally.4 However, the 
particular comovement between durables consumption and 
house prices is consistent with a credit channel, as durable 
goods purchases are often thought to be more likely financed 
by borrowing, and therefore more interest-sensitive if there are 
frictions in credit markets. If changes in the extent of credit 
frictions are in turn correlated with movements in house 
prices—for instance, if these proxy the availability of housing 
collateral—then a strong comovement between house prices 
and durable goods consumption might be generated.
The Effect of Monetary Policy on House 
Prices: Some VAR Results
Because the relationship between consumption and house 
prices suggests that a household credit channel may be part of 
the monetary transmission mechanism, we investigate how 
house prices are affected by monetary policy. We estimate a 
small vector autoregression (VAR) model of quarterly output, 
inflation, oil prices, real broad money balances, and the short-
term interest rate. Oil prices are included in this system to 
reduce the price puzzle.5 Real broad money balances are FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 3
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included as a timely information variable for the policymaker. 
To this core five-variable system, which we assume adequately 
summarises a basic macroeconomic model, we add variables of 
interest: consumption, house prices, and housing investment. 
Consumption is broken down into durables and nondurables 
consumption. The sample period, after adjusting for lags, is 
1975:2 to 1999:4, and six lags were used.6 To identify the 
monetary policy shock, we order the policy rate last in a 
recursive identification structure. The implied identifying 
restriction is that the monetary authorities observe 
contemporaneous variables when setting interest rates, but all 
variables respond with a lag to monetary policy shocks. 
The impulse-response functions, shown in Chart 2, are the 
estimated responses of all the variables in the system to an 
unexpected, one-standard-deviation increase in the short-term 
interest rate. The responses are plotted as percentage deviations 
from trend levels. They correspond broadly to our priors about 
the effects of monetary policy: real money balances fall in 
response to an unexpected monetary tightening. Output falls 
and the price level falls after some lag. House prices, housing 
investment, and consumption respond negatively to an 
unexpected monetary tightening. Housing investment 
responds more quickly than house prices and falls by more. 
The peak response in housing investment occurs after two 
quarters. The peak response to a 50-basis-point shock is 
estimated to be about 180 basis points. The peak response in 
house prices occurs later, after five quarters, but is smaller at 80 
basis points. Durable goods consumption responds more 
strongly to a monetary tightening than nondurable goods 
consumption. The estimated effect of a 50-basis-point 
monetary policy shock on durables consumption is about 80 
basis points, whereas the response of nondurables 
consumption is only 10 basis points.7
Housing Variables and the Phillips Curve
We conclude the data section by analysing the relationship 
between housing variables and inflation (Chart 1). Adding 
house prices as an explanatory variable to a Rudebusch and 
Svensson–style Phillips curve (see Rudebusch and Svensson 
[1999])—that is, inflation regressed on lagged inflation and the 
output gap—we find that house prices have no marginal 
predictive power for inflation. In a regression of output on 
lagged output, interest rates, inflation, and housing variables, 
house prices are not significant, but housing investment is. 
House prices do not have predictive power for consumption 
once lagged consumption, interest rates, and inflation are 
included in the regression. House prices therefore appear to 
affect consumption only via their effect on the transmission of 
monetary policy, which affects inflation through the output gap, 
but house prices have no marginal predictive power for inflation 
outside this mechanism. Details are provided in the appendix.
Structural Change in the Retail Credit 
Markets and Its Effect on the Pattern
of Household Debt
The VAR results are informative but need to be interpreted 
with some care. The sample spans a period of considerable 
change in the U.K. financial markets that is likely to have 
altered the empirical relationships between the variables. A 
series of major institutional and legislative changes has affected 
retail financial markets in the United Kingdom since 1979. First 
were the removal of exchange controls in 1979 and the direct 
control of bank lending (“the corset”) in 1980.8 Restrictions on 
building societies (mutually owned savings and loan 
institutions) were also lifted in a series of measures—
principally the Building Societies Act (1986)—that allowed 
them to fund themselves partially with wholesale deposits and 
hence to compete with banks on a more equal footing. The 
increase in competition resulting from these measures has been 
well documented in Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and 
references therein. In addition, starting in 1989 and continuing 
today, building societies have attempted to remove the 
remaining restrictions that separate them from banks by 
abandoning their status as mutuals in order to become banks. 
Other nonbank entrants—department stores, retailers, and 
insurance companies—have also increasingly been able to offer 
selected retail financial services, such as deposit accounts, 
credit cards, personal loans, and mortgages.
The result was a steady intensification of competition and 
product innovation in retail banking. This trend has continued 
in recent years, as retail financial markets in the United 
Kingdom have been undergoing a further period of structural 
change. As documented in the February 2001 edition of the 
Bank of England Inflation Report, “Competition in retail credit 
markets has intensified in recent years which, together with 
product innovation, may have widened the availability of credit 
and reduced its price.” The market for credit cards and 
unsecured loans, in particular, has seen a large number of new 
entrants. In the mortgage market, the prevalence of “lock-in” 
clauses in mortgage contracts has fallen. In addition, a wider 
range of mortgage products has become available, with more 
firms offering variable repayment mortgages and the facility for 
lump-sum withdrawals against net housing equity. Some 
lenders also have introduced “current account” mortgages, FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 5
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where funds can be borrowed or invested at a single rate 
without prearrangement, subject to limits based on the loan-
to-value ratio, offering even greater flexibility.
This increased competition has not led to a steady decline of 
the standard variable mortgage rate over the (overnight) repo 
rate. But temporary discounts in the variable mortgage interest 
rate—usually offered to new customers for the first one or two 
years of the mortgage—have risen, and during 2000 they stood 
at their highest recorded level. In addition, these discounted 
mortgages have risen markedly as a share of total new mortgage 
lending in recent years, to more than half, which has reduced 
the average mortgage interest rate that customers pay. 
Remortgaging—obtaining a new mortgage to refinance an 
outstanding one—has increased as a share of total mortgage 
lending, perhaps reflecting a reduction in the prevalence of 
lock-in clauses in mortgage contracts. Another notable feature 
has been the rapid increase in the use of flexible mortgage 
products, which allow the borrower to change the principal of 
the loan at a low or zero transaction cost. A recent survey by 
Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) for the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders showed that 16 percent of 
respondents now have mortgages with at least some degree of 
flexibility, defined as those mortgages offering underpayments, 
daily or monthly interest calculation, and the option of a 
payment holiday. The take-up of flexible mortgages is likely to 
increase further.
As a result of these changes, the balance sheet of households 
in the United Kingdom has changed substantially. The stock of 
aggregate debt as a fraction of annual household income 
increased from 30 percent in the late 1970s to more than 100 
percent in 2000.9 The composition of aggregate debt has also 
changed, with the share of unsecured debt increasing over the 
same period from 11 to 19 percent. In aggregate, the evidence 
suggests that households in the United Kingdom have become 
less credit-constrained. Households have access to more credit, 
and as banks have developed their retail credit expertise, 
households who previously did not qualify for credit became 
able to borrow. Bayoumi (1993) estimates that the share of 
liquidity-constrained consumers fell from 60 to 30 percent 
between 1974 and 1987.
Although reliable long runs of data are not available, the 
interest rate spreads and transaction costs associated with retail 
financial products appear to have been declining since at least 
the early 1990s. One consequence of lower transaction costs for 
mortgages, for example, has been that households have been 
better able to extract home equity when house prices rise. Chart 
1 shows the relationship between aggregate net housing equity 
(after subtracting mortgage debt) and secured borrowing for 
consumption, often referred to in the United Kingdom as 
mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW). Prior to the mid-1980s, 
there was little relationship between housing equity and MEW. 
When the mortgage market was dominated by building 
societies and subject to rationing, withdrawing additional 
equity generally required homeowners to move, which carried 
a high transaction cost (Miles 1992). As new mortgage products 
became available that allowed refinancing or additional 
borrowing at ever lower transaction costs, mortgage equity 
withdrawal became more closely linked to movements in net 
housing equity. The increased use of flexible mortgages suggests 
that this trend is likely to continue. Such products drive to zero 
the transaction cost of withdrawing additional equity.10
The next section outlines the model we use to explore the 
monetary policy implications of these structural changes.
III. Modeling the Household
Credit Channel
To analyse more formally the implications of financial 
innovations for the monetary policy transmission mechanism, 
we require a model. Here we sketch the intuitive outline of the 
model used for the analysis in the subsequent sections. 
Interested readers are referred to Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe 
(2001). Our hypothesis is that house prices play a role because 
housing is used as collateral to reduce the agency costs 
associated with borrowing to finance housing investment and 
consumption. Our model applies the Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999) model to the household sector. The BGG 
framework links the cost of firms’ external finance to the 
quality of their balance sheet and net worth. Because there are 
parallels between housing investment and business investment, 
and between house prices and the value of business capital 
goods, the BGG model provides a useful platform on which to 
build a model where house prices, housing investment, and 
consumption interact in a general-equilibrium framework.
So how should we think of credit frictions in the household 
sector? Households are exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of 
fluctuations in their house prices. On its own, this is not 
sufficient to generate a credit channel. However, personal 
bankruptcy is associated with significant monitoring costs 
faced by lenders. Lenders therefore charge a premium over the 
risk-free interest rate to borrowers. Higher net worth—or 
lower leverage—reduces the probability of default and 
therefore reduces the external finance premium.
In practice, fluctuations in the external finance premium 
may best be thought of in the following way: When house 
prices fall, households that are moving have a smaller deposit 
(that is, net worth) available than they otherwise would for the 
purchase of their next home. When households have a smaller FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 7
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Note: BGG is Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
deposit, they obtain less favourable interest rates when 
renegotiating their mortgage and have less scope for extracting 
additional equity to finance consumption. Since house prices 
significantly affect the collateral value of houses, fluctuation in 
housing prices plays a large role in the determination of 
households’ borrowing conditions.
The main modeling issue is how to generate both consumer 
borrowing and lending within a general-equilibrium 
framework without losing tractability and comparability with 
benchmark macro models.11 To avoid the complexity inherent 
in modeling the dynamic optimisation problem of 
heterogeneous consumers under liquidity constraints, we 
represent consumer behaviour in a rather stylised way. That is, 
we think of each household as being a composite of two 
behavioural types: homeowners and consumers. This 
separation makes the analysis significantly simpler, without 
losing the essence of the financial accelerator mechanism.
On the one hand, “homeowners” borrow funds to purchase 
houses from housing producers. Homeowners purchase 
houses and rent them to consumers. This flow of rental 
payments within households is captured in the United 
Kingdom’s national accounts as imputed rents. Homeowners 
finance the purchase of houses partly with their net worth and 
partly by borrowing from financial intermediaries. When 
borrowing from financial intermediaries, homeowners face an 
external finance premium caused by information asymmetries, 
just as firms are assumed to do in BGG.
On the other hand, consumers consume goods and housing 
services. They also supply labour in a competitive labour 
market. Consumers are assumed to rent housing services from 
the homeowners. Consumers and homeowners are further 
linked by a “transfer” rule that homeowners pay to consumers. 
This assumption captures the fact that households use their 
housing equity to finance consumption as well as housing 
investment. When house prices increase—and therefore 
housing equity rises—the household faces the following 
decision problem: If it increases the transfer and hence 
consumption today, current household utility would go up. 
However, if transfer payments are kept constant, net worth 
would increase, reducing the future external finance premium. 
Thus, the household faces a choice between current 
consumption and a cheaper future finance premium. The 
optimal allocation—and hence transfer payment—would 
depend on such factors as the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution, the sensitivity of the external finance premium 
with respect to household net worth, and future income 
uncertainty. In general, there exists a target level of net worth 
relative to debt (that is, leverage), and transfers depend on the 
deviation of leverage from target. Here we assume a transfer 
rule that captures the household’s decision described above. 
Transfers are assumed to be increasing in the net worth of 
households relative to their debt.
Fluctuations in transfers described in our model can be 
thought of as borrowing against home equity for consumption. 
If we interpret transfers as MEW, then the sensitivity of 
transfers with respect to home equity will also depend on the 
transaction costs involved in MEW. Keeping all else constant, 
if it is less costly to withdraw mortgage equity, MEW becomes 
more sensitive to households’ financial positions and therefore 
to house prices.
In this way, we can capture in a parsimonious form the idea 
that some elements of the household sector save while others 
borrow, and that this process is intermediated through 
financial markets with credit frictions. To emphasise the idea 
that consumers and homeowners form part of the same 
composite household, we illustrate the flow of funds within our 
model in the exhibit below.
We also assume two types of consumers. Some fraction of 
consumers has accumulated enough wealth that their 
consumption is well approximated by the permanent income 
hypothesis (PIH). Their consumption satisfies the standard 
optimising condition.12 However, the consumption of a 
certain fraction of the population does not. If these consumers 
are impatient, or if they are subject to borrowing constraints, 
their behaviour is similar to that of rule-of-thumb (ROT) 
consumers—see Campbell and Mankiw (1989)—who spend 
their current income in each period. Their consumption in 
each period is equal to their labour income and transfers. There 
is a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, on 
consumer behaviour under liquidity constraints.13 This line of 
research develops rigorous models of optimal household 
behaviour under liquidity constraints and income uncertainty. 
Our model should not be interpreted as an alternative 8 Houses as Collateral
approach to the analysis of consumption and saving under 
liquidity constraints. Rather, a major challenge for this branch 
of the literature has been that the solution to household 
optimisation problems under liquidity constraints and 
uncertainty is very complex. As a result, the construction of a 
tractable general-equilibrium model is extremely difficult. Our 
approach offers the opportunity to capture in a simple way 
many of the implications of this literature for the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism.
The rest of our model is standard. We introduce nominal 
price stickiness in the consumption goods sector so that 
monetary policy has real effects. Specifically, we assume the 
Calvo (1983) staggered price setting (see, for example, 
Woodford [1996], Rotemberg and Woodford [1999], and 
McCallum and Nelson [1999]). House prices are determined 
by a q-theory of investment with a convex adjustment cost. 
Monetary policy is assumed to follow a standard Taylor-type 
feedback rule.
In the next section, we use the model to illustrate the 
implications of recent financial innovations for monetary policy.
IV. Model Simulations: Effects of 
Financial Innovation on the 
Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism
How does the financial accelerator work in our world? A 
negative shock to the economy causes a fall in housing demand, 
which leads to a decline in house prices and a decrease in 
homeowners’ net worth. This causes an increase in the external 
finance premium, which leads to a further fall in housing 
demand and a fall in the transfer paid back to consumers. This 
fall in the transfer generates a reduction in consumption. As in 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), credit market frictions 
amplify and propagate shocks to the economy.
In this section, we analyse the effects of an unanticipated 
monetary policy loosening and show how these effects are altered 
by the financial innovations discussed in Section II. The parameter 
values chosen for the model underlying the simulations are 
discussed in Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2001).
The steady-state annual external finance premium is 
assumed to be 200 basis points, and the ratio of net worth to 
capital is 0.7, which is the average historical leverage ratio of 
U.K. households. The elasticity of the transfer with respect to 
housing equity is set at 3. This is the estimated average elasticity 
of mortgage equity withdrawal with respect to the net worth 
ratio. In this section, we experiment with changes in this 
parameter. Lastly, the share of rule-of-thumb consumers is set 
at 0.5. There is no consensus in the literature on what this share 
should be for the United Kingdom, but the range appears to be 
0-0.6 (Bayoumi 1993; Jappelli and Pagano 1989; Campbell and 
Mankiw 1989). Again, we experiment with changes in this 
parameter later in this section.
Better Access to Housing Equity
In Section II, we observed that the transaction costs of 
extracting equity from housing has fallen, and that product 
development is likely to reduce them further in the coming 
years: mortgage equity withdrawal and net housing equity have 
become more closely linked (Chart 1). In this section, we 
examine the implications of this structural change for 
monetary policy.
In our model, households face a trade-off when house prices 
rise: they can either withdraw the additional equity for 
consumption or they can use their stronger balance sheet to 
lower the rate at which they can borrow. This trade-off is 
captured by the adjustment parameter on the transfer stream 
between the house owning and consuming part of the 
household. When transaction costs fall, the elasticity of the 
transfer with respect to housing equity increases.
Chart 3 shows the responses of key variables to an 
unexpected monetary policy loosening when the elasticity of 
transfer with respect to housing equity is set to 3 and when it is 
increased to 10.14 The net effect of reducing transaction costs 
on housing investment is to dampen the response to the policy 
loosening. Its effect on consumption is to heighten the 
response. The intuition is as follows: after the monetary policy 
shock, households respond to the unexpected increase in house 
prices. When transaction costs are lower, households use more 
of the increased housing equity to finance consumption. The 
balance-sheet improvement is therefore smaller and shorter 
lasting than it would otherwise have been, and this dampens 
the positive response of housing investment and house prices. 
Chart 3 captures the result that, following a fall in transaction 
costs, fluctuations in house prices in response to a monetary 
policy shock may become smaller, while fluctuations in 
consumption may become larger.
Other Sources of Lower Liquidity Constraints
The second development in U.K. retail credit markets that we 
explore is the increased availability of unsecured consumer 
credit. This may have lowered liquidity constraints 
independently of house price fluctuations. As Bayoumi (1993) FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 9
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finds, the share of liquidity-constrained consumers fell 
significantly during the 1980s. It is likely that households now 
have better access to credit regardless of the state of the 
economy’s cycle. We proxy these developments by varying the 
share of rule-of-thumb consumers.15
Chart 4 shows the response of key variables to an interest 
rate cut when the share of ROT consumers is lowered from 0.5 
to 0.2. When there are fewer of these consumers, the responses 
of investment and house price are larger, while the 
consumption response is dampened. The intuition is as 
follows: rule-of-thumb consumers react more strongly than 
PIH consumers to changes in income, causing exaggerated 
movements in demand over and above those generated by the 
movement in real interest rates. When there are fewer of these 
consumers, a given monetary policy shock will have a smaller 
effect on consumption demand and therefore a smaller effect 
on inflation. If there is less inflation to react to, the nominal 
interest rate will not revert to trend as quickly, and the overall 
real interest rate response will be larger. The response of 
investment is therefore larger.
The two structural changes in the U.K. economy that we 
have discussed therefore have opposite effects. As people 
become less liquidity-constrained, they are better able to 
smooth consumption. However, increased access to housing 
collateral has linked consumption more closely to house prices, 
making it respond more strongly to monetary policy shocks. 
For housing investment, the response is the opposite. More 
rapid extraction of mortgage equity means that the balance 
sheet of homeowners changes less following a change in house 
prices. This lessens the financial accelerator effect. Fewer 
liquidity constraints, however, mean that the inflationary 
impact of a monetary policy shock is smaller, and a feedback 
rule dictates that monetary policy should revert to trend more 
slowly, causing a larger real interest rate change, which causes a 
larger investment response.
A logical next question is what the combined result would 
be of both structural changes. The short but uninteresting 
answer is that it depends on the chosen parameters. Perhaps a 
more fruitful approach is to examine plausible ranges for the 
parameters and to see under what conditions one effect 
dominates the other. The natural range for the share of rule-of-
thumb consumers is 0 to 1. The transfer adjustment is more 
difficult to parameterise. Estimating the elasticity of mortgage 
equity withdrawal over the whole sample period gives a result 
of approximately 3, which we use in our benchmark model. 
Estimating the elasticity over a more recent period (1986-99) 
gives a much higher elasticity of 20. We are cautious about the 
precision of such estimates over short sample periods. Yet a 
precise estimate is not required for this particular exercise, and 
we use 20 as the upper bound of the plausible range of values 
for the elasticity of transfer with respect to net housing equity.10 Houses as Collateral
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ROT = 0.2
ROT = 0.5
The table shows the initial consumption, housing investment, 
and house price responses for the range of parameters we posited 
as plausible. Some intuitively appealing facts emerge. Moving 
from a very constrained to a slightly less constrained model 
results in the biggest changes. Further relaxations of constraints 
cause relatively smaller changes thereafter. Across the plausible 
range, the result that house prices and housing investment will 
move less when credit constraints are relaxed probably holds 
more generally. The result for consumption is more sensitive to 
the particular parameter choice. However, the difference in the 
consumption response with tighter or looser constraints is 
generally smaller than the difference in the housing investment 
and house price response. We tentatively conclude that the 
covariance between housing and consumption is likely to have 
fallen, as has the sensitivity of house prices to monetary policy 
shocks. This has important implications for the information 
content of house price movements in order to evaluate the 
magnitude of the shocks hitting the economy. In other words, 
the elasticity of consumption with respect to housing wealth has 
risen, which means that the estimated coefficient on house prices 
in reduced-form consumption functions over long sample 
periods will be biased downward.
Sensitivity Test
Percentage Deviations from Trend
Rule-of-Thumb Share
Initial Response of Consumption
Elasticity 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1
1 -1.03 -0.73 -0.61 -0.55 -0.51
5 -1.10 -0.79 -0.67 -0.61 -0.57
10 -1.14 -0.82 -0.69 -0.62 -0.58
15 -1.19 -0.85 -0.71 -0.63 -0.58
20 -1.23 -0.88 -0.72 -0.64 -0.59
Initial Response of Housing Investment
Elasticity 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1
1 -3.19 -3.76 -4.01 -4.15 -4.24
5 -1.33 -1.57 -1.68 -1.74 -1.78
10 -1.04 -1.23 -1.32 -1.38 -1.42
15 -0.93 -1.12 -1.21 -1.27 -1.31
20 -0.88 -1.06 -1.15 -1.21 -1.25
Initial Response of House Prices
Elasticity 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1
1 -1.47 -1.79 -1.93 -2.00 -2.05
5 -0.53 -0.68 -0.75 -0.79 -0.82
10 -0.37 -0.51 -0.57 -0.61 -0.64
15 -0.32 -0.45 -0.51 -0.55 -0.58
20 -0.28 -0.42 -0.48 -0.52 -0.55FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 11
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we suggest that the link between house prices and 
consumption may have changed. We use a financial accelerator 
model of the household sector to simulate the impact of two 
kinds of the financial innovation that have occurred in the 
United Kingdom.
First, we examine the effect of recent developments in 
mortgage markets. We show that these developments increase 
the response of consumption to a monetary policy shock, but 
reduce the response of housing investment and prices. In the 
second experiment, we simulate the effect of developments in 
unsecured lending on consumption, proxied by a reduction in 
the number of rule-of-thumb consumers in the economy. Here 
it is shown that the effects are reversed: the response of housing 
investment and prices is larger, but the effect on consumption 
is dampened. For a wide range of parameter choices, the 
aggregate effect of the financial innovations combined is that 
the magnitude of house price responses has declined relative to 
consumption responses. This finding has important 
implications for the information content of house prices and 
the stability of reduced-form consumption functions that 
include housing prices or the housing stock. As a result of 
financial innovations, house prices are likely to move less than 
they did before to the same economic shocks. Therefore, we 
could not conclude that shocks have become smaller if house 
price movements have become smaller. Moreover, the 
responses of consumption and housing investment may also 
have changed. After the financial innovations, our model 
predicts that consumption should move by relatively more in 
response to a shock, but housing variables should move less.12 Houses as Collateral
Appendix: Housing in the Phillips Curve
We report some simple reduced-form regressions here to 
investigate whether house prices help explain output, 
consumption, and inflation.
Our sample period is 1974:1-1999:4 and generally four lags 
of each variable are used.16 The gap term is an output gap 
estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter on quarterly GDP 
data. Inflation   is the log first difference of the GDP 
deflator, house price (hp) is the Department of the 
Environment, Transport, and the Regions house price index 
deflated by the GDP deflator, and the interest rate (R) is the 
Bank of England’s repo rate. All variables are in logs, except 
interest rates, which are entered as log (1+ interest.rate). 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
At the bottom of the table, we report the result from a Wald 
test that the house price terms are jointly insignificant as well as 
the probability associated with the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance.
π ()
Housing in the Phillips Curve
Variable
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3






















-0.17 -0.01  0.39
(0.10) (0.13) (0.09)





















F-stat (prob) 0.47 1.96 1.66
(0.76) (0.11) (0.17)










π t 1 –
π t 2 –
π t 3 –











hpt i – 0 =Endnotes
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 13
1. See, for example, Miles (1992).
2. For ease of visual interpretation, data in this section are detrended by 
taking logs and regressing them on a constant and a quadratic time 
trend.
3. The q-theory of investment assumes that there are costs of adjusting 
the capital stock to its desired level. In the case we consider here, there 
are costs of adjusting the stock of housing to its desired level. 
Whenever the expected future return to housing increases, households 
will want to increase housing investment now to avoid the costs of 
adjusting the housing stock all at once in the future. The value of the 
housing stock will therefore rise immediately. This mechanism 
therefore causes a comovement between house prices and housing 
investment. If the returns to housing are driven by the same factors 
that drive the return to other types of capital, house prices will be 
positively correlated with aggregate output as well.
4. The permanent income hypothesis states that consumption decisions 
are based on expected total lifetime income, not period-by-period 
anticipated variations in income. As with housing investment decisions, 
consumers are therefore forward-looking and will vary consumption 
today when there are unexpected changes in future income. If unexpected 
changes in future income are correlated with unexpected changes in 
future returns to housing, then consumption and housing investment will 
be correlated. Alternatively, the correlation between housing investment 
and consumption can be generated if consumption is subject to 
preference shocks over both consumption goods and housing.
5. The price puzzle is the finding that for certain specifications of VAR 
models, the price level rises following a monetary policy tightening. 
For a discussion of the price puzzle, see, for example, Sims (1992).
6. We started with eight lags and tested down using likelihood ratio 
tests. The null hypothesis of five lags against an alternative hypothesis 
of six lags was rejected at the 1 percent confidence interval.
7. The standard error bands on these impulse response functions 
are large, because by incorporating all variables at once we have 
sacrificed degrees of freedom. Introducing variables one by one,
as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), reduces the 
standard error bands but leaves patterns of the responses broadly 
unchanged. We report only the more conservative results, based on 
the full system.
8. See, for example, Goodhart (1989).
9. The increase in home ownership has also contributed to the rise in 
the aggregate stock of household debt.
10. Several lenders offer products in which the transaction cost is 
already zero: the customer merely requests an additional loan by 
telephone or the Internet and no fee is charged. The interest rate on 
the loan is the same interest rate as on the original mortgage 
borrowing. See, for example, recent editions of Moneyfacts, a U.K. 
consumer finance publication.
11. Many models of household saving behaviour assume the 
overlapping-generations framework to ensure that both borrowing 
and lending occur in equilibrium. See, for example, Gourinchas 
(2000) and Gertler (1999).
12. The standard optimising condition in this case (also known as the 
Euler equation) states that the optimal path of consumption will 
satisfy the following condition: the marginal rate at which consumers 
are willing to substitute consumption in one period for consumption 
in the next period should be equal to the real interest rate—that is, the 
marginal rate at which consumption in one period can be transformed 
into consumption in the next period.
13. See, for example, Deaton (1991, 1992), Carroll (1997), and 
Gourinchas (2000). Although much of the literature focuses on 
nondurables consumption, Carroll and Dunn (1997) consider the 
effects of household balance sheets on consumption of both 
nondurable goods and housing.
14. Here we set a monetary policy shock as a 50-basis-point 
(annualised) fall in nominal interest rates. This corresponds 
approximately to a one-standard-deviation monetary policy shock 
from the estimated VAR.
15. However, it should be noted that factors other than liquidity 
constraints are also important for justifying a high marginal propensity 
to consume out of current income, such as the impatience of consumers. 
If consumers are sufficiently impatient, relaxing liquidity constraints 
reduces marginal propensity to consume only temporarily (that is, only 
in the transition to a new steady state). Alternatively, it is possible to 
interpret ROT behaviour as a result of near rationality.
16. We also experimented with different lag structures and sample 
periods. The results are largely unchanged, except for the consumption 
equation, where house prices have marginal significance for some lag 
structures, but this result is highly sensitive to the choice of sample period.References
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